Can Services = Security? Part 1

Source: vethno

¶ I’ve been thinking about this topic for quite a long time.  In fact, my experiences in conflict areas and contemplation of what denotes ‘security’ (locally and internationally) is a major reason I decided to enter the veterinary public health arena.  Even though this has been an underlying concept for me, it is only recently that I’ve been thinking about writing about it – in particular, a while back, @bentruscello (blog) sent me a link to the Frontline piece entitled, “Obama’s War“.  It chronicles the actions of a U.S. Marine unit in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, and discusses some of the ongoing challenges faced by the U.S. military in providing security for, and gaining the trust of, the local population.  As I watched the piece, an underlying theme emerged for me, in that there is a large need for agricultural and public health service development, as well as development and maintenance of markets.  Couple the Frontline piece with the recent testimony to Congress and President Obama’s speech regarding increased troop deployments and civilian aid to Afghanistan (yes, I watched the entire testimony).  Even more recently, Reuters columnist, Bernd Debusmann, released an opinion piece entitled, “American Intelligence and Fortune Telling“, wherein he describes a recent assessment by military leadership (released through a think tank instead of normal government channels) about information collection in Afghanistan:

“The … vast intelligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade. Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced, incurious about the correlations between various development projects and the levels of cooperation among the villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers … U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high-level decision makers seeking the knowledge, analysis and information they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency.”

¶ I mention this topic not to discuss the U.S. intelligence collection methods, nor specifically to address the weaknesses cited in the report; instead, I want to highlight the topic of how social services development, training/education, and outreach can assist those trying to provide security for the region with information regarding the social dynamics present in an area.  Such knowledge – which appears to be lacking – provides security forces a context in which to operate and an understanding of topics important to the local population – services development engages the population in their own livelihoods and provides a social ‘intangible’ security.  In reality, what might appear important to multinational forces for security, might not in actuality be of great concern to the local population.  Marrying up the two perspectives becomes the important (and challenging) part.  I’ll touch more on this later (and in future posts) regarding socio-dynamic collection mechanisms such as Human Terrain Systems.  But first…

¶ The final piece that made me decide to sit down and write about this topic was a NPR interview with the new USAID chief, Rajiv Shah, a medical doctor who previously worked on agriculture development programs for the Gates Foundation.  A few noteworthy comments from Dr. Shah regarding development and security emerged:

¶ In my opinion, these are very interesting points that have rarely been publicly discussed, possibly due to the potential to ‘taint’ development programs in an unfavorable, national security light – possibly leading to criticism of ‘ulterior motives’.  From a large scale, national security perspective, development does indeed serve the purposes of national security policy.  However, at the local security level, as highlighted in the Frontline piece, can development of services and infrastructure become a form of security?  In fact, in a rapidly changing security environment, as seen in an insurgency (or non-traditional conflict) scenario, are these factors, in a way, somewhat of a prerequisite to truly providing security to the local population?

Services as Infrastructure Resources

¶ In thinking about this topic, I couldn’t help but remember an article in the satirical publication The Onion years ago (2005) entitled, “Iraqi Cop Moonlighting as Terrorist Just to Make Ends Meet.”  Sadly, I remember the article for it’s humor and the fact that it rung true from my time in Iraq.  In the context of this post, however, it acts to highlight the importance of stability, livelihood security, and sustainable services in developing countries and conflict areas – basically, bringing to light the impact a lack of such services can have on security in a region.  Physical security for the population is only one aspect of an overall stabilization and security mission, and unfortunately in many situations, the local population will accept physical protection provided by those groups currently present, as well as those that provide for the services and infrastructure in the location.

¶ This point was very poignant for me when watching “Obama’s War” when some local Afghan farmers were distrustful of American troop presence and promises of safety in Helmand Province – in the locals’ minds, the U.S. troops had previously moved into the area, secured it, and subsequently pulled out, without developing any sustainable services or infrastructure.  Taliban moved in shortly after to fill the void in each case.  This lead to an ongoing yo-yo effect for the locals, who seemed to feel that other development and return to their livelihoods were impossible with constantly changing physical security situations.  For instance, the Americans wanted a market to open again, but the locals had recently been told by Taliban officials to close the market – distrust breeds stagnation.

¶ In the book, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World, author (and former Afghan finance minister) Ashraf Ghani discusses similar situations where physical security and services/infrastructure development have been used in tandem to obtain the support of the local population.  One such example is that seen in Lebanon with Hezbollah.  In particular, after the 2006 Israeli military strikes, Hezbollah (not international aid funding, organizations, or the Lebanese government) provided a majority of the initial infrastructure reconstruction and social services provision to the Lebanese population (specifically focused on the poor population hardest hit in southern Beirut).  In fact, Lebanese banks apparently were able to raise $80 billion in deposits for aid and reconstruction, but did not have the financial instruments to distribute the money; therefore, Hezbollah quickly filled the void in service provision.  The Hezbollah model of rapidly funding reconstruction, schools and education, health care, and other social services, has been extremely successful in providing the local population with a sense of security, over the dysfunctional Lebanese government.  In addition to this, Ghani discusses other interesting points, of which the following are only a sampling:

“…many participants in peace agreement cite bad governance as the root cause of conflict and state that functioning institutions are the key to stability.  Nevertheless, implementation has nearly always fallen short of these lofty ambitions because the skills, resources, time horizons, and staying power necessary for their realization have by and large not been mastered.”

“Only in the wake of 9/11 has it become clear how much the current functioning of the international system acts as a constraint rather than an asset in the fight against terrorism and other global threats.  The aid system has had the perverse effect of fragmenting states’ ability to perform key functions.  Further, the aid system is organized into a series of “stovepipes” that keep economic, political, and security issues separate from one another.”

“In developing countries, the state has often failed to acquire the flexible architectures needed to enter into a dynamic and collaborative partnership with the citizenry and the market.”

“By doctrine and training, the U.S. army and European forces were designed to fight industrial wars.  Today’s insecurity emanates from networks of people rather than from organized, hierarchical states and their armies.”

¶ He goes on to discuss how aid projects often provide parallel services that are supposed to be the function of the state.  With bad governance, these services are often lacking; however, many aid projects are marred by ineffectual and complex funding systems based on each project’s donor requirements – there are many cases of project overlap or inconsistent implementation, as well.  I agree with the point that in order for a country to progress, effective governance is critical for development of the economy, public health systems, education, etc.  However, in conflict situations, much of the government tends to be eroded, non-existent, or not supported by large portions of the population.  We’ve seen the effect of corruption and poor governance in Afghanistan on basic service provision.

¶ The foundation of social services sets the stage for market and economic sector development, support to individual livelihoods, public health, and food security, which in the end, supports the efforts of units trying to provide physical security.  Services become forms of ‘soft infrastructure’, if you will, by investing in the human capital in a region.  They are not independent of physical security, nor is physical security effective without services.  Therefore, can we devise methodologies to plan and implement security functions in conflict areas with more of a holistic approach?

The ‘Combined Arms’ Approach to Security and Development in Conflict?

¶ Previously, the U.S. military devised an approach to warfare deemed ‘Combined Arms’, meaning units with separate primary functions were placed together under one commander in order to provide flexibility and multiple skill sets within one unit – effectively breaking through some of the original organizational and bureaucratic constraints and allowing more of a functional/practical approach to their mission functions.  This thought entered my head when listening to President Obama’s speech and the Clinton/Gates/Mullen testimony before congress.  Not in the sense of more troops planned for deployment to Afghanistan; instead, their comments regarding increasing the civilian deployments to the country for the purpose of supporting infrastructure such as agriculture.  Is this a step in the right direction and in a sense, the beginning of a ‘combined arms’ approach to development in a conflict situation?

¶ I personally believe it’s a good start; however, after seeing first-hand government civilian deployments to Iraq, I am not sure if it will go far enough.  There are critical skill sets in the commercial and academic sectors that are not retained in great numbers in the government civilian workforce.  Further, the number (and willingness) of government civilians able to deploy will quickly reach saturation.  Therefore, should the government also implement methods to attract commercial and academic civilians with specialized skills into the effort?  Such individuals also bring with them personal and professional connections to which government civilians are often not exposed, thereby increasing the potential for outside investment, provision of technology and expertise, etc., that would not be accessed normally.  An example of this came to mind when I read a Wired Magazine article called, “Booting Up Baghdad: Tech Execs Take a Tour in Iraq“.  It describes a visit by executives from MeetUp, Google, Twitter, YouTube, Blue State Digital, WordPress, Howcast, and AT&T to Iraq (invited by the U.S. Department of State) to meet with Iraqi leadership, observe the country, and identify potential areas for technology investment and new media.

¶ So, without initial considerations for the effects of good governance (I know this is a big omission, but it is outside the scope of this current discussion), one can begin to examine a framework to provide more holistic security, borrowing from several sources (to include Hezbollah’s model).  ‘Hard’ (or physical) and ‘soft’ security (services, markets and human capital) work in tandem with sustained, concerted effort.  Looking back at my time in Kosovo, I realize we were initially doing just this – we were living with the local population in the towns, assisting with reestablishing local markets, providing medical care and supporting the indigenous public health system (however rudimentary), and reestablishing school.  We also had a role in assisting agricultural development, and reestablishment of local governments.  Foreign Affairs wrote in 1999 about our efforts, as did my former Battalion Commander (ref).  Looking back, a distinct transition is clear to me.  Upon arrival in Kosovo, a new commanding General changed the way we were conducting our operations.  He felt the units should be pulled back onto our compounds and conduct patrols from those locations – within a few weeks, the area had degraded nearly to the state in which we found it.  Organized crime groups moved in to fill the service void, markets shut down, schools, basic health services and local government functions were degraded.  In my opinion, this is due to our lack of continued, direct ‘soft security’ engagement with the population, since our physical security patrols were no less robust.  Another ‘lesson learned’ I took away from this experience (which served me well in Iraq), was that a ‘one size fits all’ approach does not work.  We discovered that each support service we provided had to be tailored to the unique characteristics of the population (e.g. Serb, Albanian, Roma, etc.).

The Weakness Inherent in Human Terrain Systems

¶ Back to ‘Human Terrain Systems’ (HTS)…There has been much criticism of HTS (in particular from the social science community) regarding potential ethical violations by social scientists involved.  The blog Zero Anthropology has followed the course of the program and the American Anthropological Association issued a formal statement in 2007 expressing it’s disapproval of HTS and called into question possible violations of it’s Code of Ethics by anthropologists involved in the project.  I guess my personal opinion straddles this debate, having served in both military/national security, as well as development/aid roles.  I believe the concept of understanding a local population, cultural practices, needs/requirements/interests, and resources and infrastructure is very important to military units in areas of operation and critical to effectively securing themselves and the local population; however, I think the major weakness of HTS is it’s reliance solely on social scientists.  Gathering information through observation and interviews is a one-way street, often seen by the population as a purely self-serving endeavor (perception is reality, in most cases).  I would posit that integration of other skill sets (e.g. engineering, agricultural, medical) and provision of services would actually secondarily obtain the information the social scientists are collecting, while simultaneously building resource capacity for the local population – the one-way street becomes a two-way, and engages the populace in their own development and security.  Perhaps this would also alleviate some of the ethical concerns posed by the social scientist community?  I have read the HTS handbook and know some of the principle people involved early in it’s development, yet still do not understand the continued rigidity of such a one-sided approach (I won’t post a link to the handbook, but it was leaked in 2008).  In general, the military and non-governmental organizations have an inherent distrust of one another, yet in conflict situations, I believe they could benefit greatly from one another.  Perhaps we should start to examine and understand the different viewpoints and requirements of each group and how they can serve a mutual goal?

¶ Regardless of the methodology involved, the groups or organizations involved in doing the work – true achievement of ‘soft security’ through provision of services and development of markets can only be sustainable by the eventual assumption of these infrastructure components by the local population.  Initially, as a military unit provides physical security, combined teams of military, civilian, local government representatives and non-governmental organizations could unite and coordinate their efforts to provide training, education, services and establishment of markets that could eventually be taken over fully by the local population.  Ghani is in favor of foreign investment in, instead of foreign aid for Afghanistan – in the very early stages of post-conflict development (and prior to establishment of decent security), investment might not be a reality (the investors require some measure of assurance for the security of their investments).  How do we fill the void and establish this early security?  Early engagement of the populace and concentration on training/education, and re-establishment of services can act in a synergistic manner with physical security – the local population has access to information and resources (tailored to their requirements), while the security forces have the cooperation and trust of the locals.  Without such a combined approach, there will be the continued yo-yo effect of security power struggles.

Stay tuned for ‘Can Services = Security? Par Deux’, focusing on training, education, and markets.

Tagged as: Afghanistan, Agriculture, analysis, animal production, conflict, developing world, Development, education and training, ethnography, Intelligence, Markets, Military, public health, Security, Services, social practices, technology, War